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A 1985 class action suit on behalf of homeless individuals living in the
City of St. Louis mandates both short-term and long-term services to
homeless persons. These court-ordered requirements bring together an
interesting triparite system: (1) the adversarialand justice-orientedlegal system, (b) the highly political city government, and (c) the traditionally voluntary system of human service providers. Service
provision to the homeless, the utility of advocacy, privatization, and
the ethics of public disclosure are examined from a sociological conflict
and control perspective. The St. Louis experience provides guidance
for communities wishing to engage the legal, political, and social service delivery systems on behalf of the complex needs of the homeless.

Only quite recently and only in a few large urban cities
around the country have there been any successful attempts to
use the courts to insure the rights of the homeless to minimal
relief. The legal aspects of these court actions have been re*The authors wish to acknowledge the help of Ken Chackes of Missouri
Protection and Advocacy Services for providing the chronology of events
relating to the St. Louis homeless litigation.
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viewed (Werner, 1984; Chackes, 1987; Hayes, 1987). Nonetheless, the court decree itself is a step marking the culmination of
a long process of advocacy and the beginning of a process of
implementation. This implementation process involves conflict
and control, checks and balances among the several parties involved. In this article, we examine these processes in the light
of a recent experience in St. Louis where the court, the local city
political leadership, and social service organizations have come
together to provide minimal guarantees of survival services to
homeless people. This combination of the necessarily adversarial
and justice-oriented legal system, the highly political city government, and the traditionally voluntary system of human services is examined from a sociological conflict and control
perspective.
Background and Context for the Court Action
Until recently, St. Louis's political and legal systems remained disengaged from providing services to the homeless.
Traditionally, only the human service sector had been engaged.
However, with the filing of Graham v. Schoemehl (1985a), a class
action lawsuit on behalf of homeless clients by Legal Services
of Eastern Missouri, the City of St. Louis was charged to provide
shelter and additional services to relieve the plight of poor homeless individuals in St. Louis. This action resulted in a courtordered consent decree that effectually engaged the legal, political and human service sectors in services to homeless persons
(Graham v. Schoemehl, 1985b).
Blumer (1971) points out that social problems exist as a fact
of collective behavior; they are present in society in a greater or
lesser degree at all times. But in order for a particular social
problem to become part of public consciousness, it must come
to the forefront and be recognized, or legitimized, as a public
social problem. Using Blumer's model, Stern (1984) first outlined
the process by which homelessness came to be defined as a
public problem: (a) EMERGENCE: (through agitation, violence,
interest groups, or political attention); (b) LEGITIMATION: the
explanation of the problem is agreed upon; (c) MOBILIZATION:
forces mount to attack the problem; (d) DEVELOPMENT: an
official solution is determined; and (e) IMPLEMENTATION: the
plan is operationalized.
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This article draws out these stages and clarifies them by the
St. Louis experience. It is shown how the assignment of these
stages are distributed among the legal, political and voluntary
human service systems in meeting the needs of the homeless.
Emergence: Advocacy
A common element in the background of cities which have
moved toward litigation to insure the rights of the homeless is
the existence of a powerful advocative force. Such advocacy appears collectively in groups like the National Coalition for the
Homeless and New York's research-based Community Service
Society. In St. Louis, however, a local evangelist, Larry Rice, is
credited for bringing ongoing attention to the problem of homelessness. Reverend Rice, who has worked with the homeless for
14 years, operates New Life Evangelistic Center, a downtown
shelter for homeless men, and several other shelters state-wide.
His work and his calculated use of the media have brought constant awareness to homelessness as a critical social problem in
St. Louis.
Rice has openly confronted the Mayor with nonviolent public demonstrations such as sleeping in a cardboard box in front
of City Hall. Rice also owns a television station. On his nightly
winter trips to gather homeless persons into shelter from abandoned buildings and under bridges, camera crews go with him
to film and interview homeless people. Although one may disagree with his methods, the fact remains that he is largely responsible for bringing homelessness to bear on the public
consciousness (Lobbia, 1985). In general, public opinion has responded to Rice. A recent City survey indicated that residents
felt that homeless shelters and condemned building services
ranked highest on the Service Need Index (Mayor's Task Force
for Improved City Services, 1986).
Actual pressure for a trial to determine whether the City was
responsible to provide shelter and services for the homeless began to build late in December 1984. Before discussing the other
phases of the process, we shall present a brief chronology of
events relating to the St. Louis homeless litigation:
12/17/84 Plaintiffs attorneys (Kenneth M. Chackes of
Washington University School of Law, and Daniel Glazier, Michael Ferry and Sandra Farragut-Hemphill of Legal Services of
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Eastern Missouri) sent a letter to Mayor Vincent Schoemehl describing the nature and scope of the homeless problem in
St. Louis, asserting that the city had the power and the duty to
provide shelter and other necessary services to the homeless,
requesting the city to provide such relief, and inviting a discussion of those matters.
1/4/85 Plaintiff's attorneys met with representatives of the
city (four attorneys from the City Counselor's Office and a representative of the Mayor) who indicated no dispute about the
existence of a problem, but questioned whether the city had a
duty, and requested information regarding the size and cost of
the proposed shelter operation. Plaintiff's attorneys indicated
they would file a lawsuit within three weeks and that if agreement could be reached it should be in the form of a consent
decree approved by the court.
1/10/85 Plaintiffs' attorneys sent information to the city regarding the cost of operating a "decent" shelter.
1/85 Later in January the Mayor appointed a task force,
chaired by George Eberle, to study the problem of homelessness
and make recommendations for the city's response.
2/11/85 Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against the
Mayor and city seeking a declaration of the city's duty to relieve,
maintain and support the homeless, and an injunction requiring
the city to provide shelter and other services to the homeless,
including food, health care, hygienic services, housing and employment assistance, and transportation. Along with the petition
plaintiffs filed discovery requests to determine what the city
knew about homelessness and what the city was doing to meet
the needs of the homeless.
3/6/85 The city also filed discovery requests seeking information about the individual plaintiffs and information known
to plaintiffs and their attorneys regarding the problems of the
poor and homeless.
3/29/85 Plaintiffs responded to defendants' discovery requests providing substantial information.
4/8/85 Defendants objected to providing information in response to plaintiffs' discovery requests.
4/19/85 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit,
contending that the court had no jurisdiction to hear the case
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because the city's response to the problems of the poor and
homeless was a political matter, not subject to interference by
a court.
4/85 The Mayor's task force completed its study, making
essentially the same findings that had been made by plaintiffs'
attorneys, and recommending solutions in the same areas for
which relief was sought in the lawsuit.
5/31/85 Attorneys for both sides engaged in oral argument
before the court regarding defendants' motion to dismiss. While
the judge postponed his ruling on the motion pending further
briefing by the attorneys, on that and several other occasions he
expressed concerns about the problems of the homeless, but
serious reservations about his power to issue an injunction ordering the city to take steps to address those problems. Trial on
the merits of plaintiffs' petition was scheduled for November 18,
1985.
7/11/85 A hearing was scheduled before the court for the
presentation of evidence regarding class certification-whether
the case should proceed as a class action and, if so, the proper
definition of the class. The judge postponed the hearing because
he had not yet ruled on the defendants' motion to dismiss.
9/4/85 A second class certification hearing was scheduled
but postponed.
10/4/85 The judge formally overruled defendants' motion
to dismiss but expressly reserved the issue whether the court
could order any injunctive relief against the city. The attorneys
submitted written evidence to the court regarding the class certification issues, and orally argued the discovery dispute arising
out of the city's refusal to provide the information requested by
plaintiffs. The judge ordered the city to provide whatever information it had readily available that would respond to plaintiffs'
discovery requests.
11/8/85 With 10 days remaining before trial plaintiffs took
the depositions of four city officials identified by defendants as
having responsibility for the city's programs to aid the poor.
11/85 In preparation for trial, plaintiffs' attorneys met with
the chairman of the Mayor's task force on homelessness to discuss his group's findings and recommendations, and to determine whether he would testify to those matters at the trial. The
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chairman indicated that he would testify if necessary, but that
there should be no trial because, as the task force had recommended, the city should provide the shelter and most of the
other services sought in the lawsuit. By that time the city was
already taking steps to implement many of the task force recommendations, but had made no progress toward making more
shelter available. The chairman of the task force promised to
convey to the Mayor his view that the case should be settled.
11/13/85 Five days before trial plaintiffs' attorneys met with
the city's attorney to take the deposition of an aide to the Mayor.
The chairman of the task force was present, however, and instead of taking the deposition, the attorneys negotiated the basic
ingredients of a settlement. The city agreed to a court order
establishing its duty to aid the homeless and requiring it to
provide shelter and other specified services.
11/15/85 On the Friday before the Monday trial date attorneys for both sides met in court, but the city was not yet ready
to sign the consent decree and sought a continuance of the trial.
The judge put off ruling on that request and the parties agreed
to work toward a settlement. By Friday afternoon one issue remained-the portion of the consent decree that would obligate
the city to continue to meet the needs of the homeless after the
initial one-year programs would expire. Before the day was over
the city agreed to a continuing obligation and the parties and
the judge signed the decree.
Legitimation: Issues of Ownership
Once advocacy and media attention had moved homelessness toward classification as a social problem, the next step,
legitimation, commenced. Like the precedent New York case
Callahan v. Carey, 1979 which catapulted homelessness into the
national consciousness, Graham v. Schoemehl, 1985 legitimized
homelessness as a public social problem in St. Louis. The legitimation stage is extremely important-even to the point of determining whether or not the social problem will, in the public
sense, survive. And as Stern (1984) points out, the legitimation
phase decides who owns the problem.
The law which backed the consent decree had been a state
statute since Missouri's territorial days: "Poor persons shall be
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relieved and supported by the county of which they are inhabitants" (Missouri Revised Statutes, 1978). The necessary and primary task that followed was the legal determination of class.
Once the right to a class action suit is determined, the court
must then decide whether or not a government is neglecting or
failing to perform its duty within reasonable discretionary standards. It is the court's role to determine if government is meeting
its responsibility, rather than dictating how government is to
accomplish the mandate. In other words, the courts may require
that government do something, but cannot say how that thing
is to be done. This accounts for the differences noted later in
this article between implementation of the New York and
St. Louis consent decrees.
Notwithstanding, it is implicit in the law that relief for the
poor must meet conditions necessary for survival. Chackes (1987,
p. 193) argues,
Going even further, a court could determine that lawmakers intended that the duty encompass not only short-term help, but assistance to allow the homeless to better themselves and escape the
cycle of homelessness. The assistance could include services like
life skills education, job training, and assistance in finding employment or permanent housing.
At the same time, however, temperance must guide the use
of the power of the court. Although remedial action needs to be
taken when other branches of government are in violation of the
law, the court must be guided by two additional principles in
determining appropriate remedies: (a) the nature and scope of
the remedy should be no more extensive than the nature and
scope of the right violated; and (b) in order to respect the separation of powers doctrine, the remedy should intrude no more
than necessary into the affairs of the coordinate branches of
government (Chackes, 1987, p. 196).
Mobilization of Community Resources
Contingent with the filing of the lawsuit, as the chronology
reports, the Mayor appointed a task force consisting of the heads
of major social service agencies traditionally working with the
homeless. Their task was to study the problem and make rec-
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ommendations to the Mayor. When the recommendations of the
task force aligned with the charges of the legal document, the
City had little recourse but to provide services to these poor
citizens within its domain. Directives from these professionals,
although outside the adversarial stance of the lawsuit, nevertheless added strength to the lawsuit from the legal parties. As the
court date grew near, the legal system also sought professional
testimony from these same human service professionals, should
the matter go to court. Thus, the human service sector provided
expert testimony to both the legal and political systems in their
adversarial stance.
Development of an Official Solution
The consent decree defined the homeless as "persons without
shelter, temporarily staying in a private shelter for homeless
people, or with inadequate shelter such that a person cannot
live in it without substantial risk to life, health and safety" (Graham v. Schoemehl, 1987b, p. 2). The order mandated that no less
than $310,000 be appropriated during FY 1985-1986 to implement services for the homeless.
The consent decree charged the City to increase shelter for
the homeless. During 1986, a minimum of 200 additional beds
were to be added at the rate of 12 to 20 new beds per month.
These temporary shelter beds, available for use 24 hours per
day, allowed a maximum 60 day length of stay. Minimum service standards were also set for these temporary shelter facilities.
In addition, the City was required to provide at least 100 units
of permanent housing for the homeless at the rate of 7 to 10 per
month.
A noteworthy and important component of the St. Louis
consent decree was that it spelled out what additional services
were to accompany the mandate for more shelter beds. Since
these services were written into the court document, it was unequivocally established that the development of the official solution to homelessness in St. Louis was more than food and
shelter. Specifically mentioned were: (a) a crisis-oriented reception center, (b) transportation services, (c) day center for women
and children, and (d) transitional services (Graham v. Schoemehl, 1985b). These programs formed the core of the City's new
Homeless Services Network (HSN) designed to coordinate ser-
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vices to the homeless on a community-wide level. This Network
is now nationally known as a model approach that works (Whitman, 1988).
Lastly, the decree required the City to provide copies of
monthly reports submitted by the social service providers to the
legal counsel on behalf of the homeless. This court-ordered demand for documentation engaged the services of professional
researchers to verify that the consent decree was being followed.
Implementation: The Homeless Services Network
With the signing of the consent decree, the City established
the new system to meet the needs of the homeless. Previous to
the lawsuit, The Salvation Army Emergency Lodge was the only
shelter receiving local government funding through block grant
allocations. The Emergency Lodge's continuum of services model
was expanded in the development of the Homeless Services Network (HSN). This multidimensional networking model (Hutchison, Searight & Stretch, 1986) is built on the conviction that
comprehensive policy and program planning is needed to meet
the needs of homeless persons (Bassuk & Lauriat, 1984; Kaufman, 1984; Stoner, 1984).
Because of their expert and timely involvement in the mobilization stage, social service agency executives were in key
positions to responsibly implement the wide range of services
specified in the consent decree. A public-private partnership
was born as the City contracted out required services for the
homeless to five major social service agencies:
(a) The Reception Center, a 24-hour walk-in, call-in crisis
hotline operated by The Salvation Army. The Reception Center
serves as the central intake and referral point for emergency
shelter in St. Louis and the statistical center for the Network.
(b) Christ Church Cathedral Day Shelter for women and
children operated by Consolidated Neighborhood Services
(CNSI). The day shelter provides daily meals, shower and laundry facilities, and child care.
(c) St. Patrick's Center of Catholic Charities provides comprehensive employment counseling and housing placement services. In addition, life skills training classes are held on parenting,
budgeting, and tenant rights and responsibilities.
(d) The American Red Cross supplies transportation ser-
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vices between emergency shelters, Reception Center, Day Shelter, and other sites like health clinics and job interviews
(Department of Human Resources, 1986).
(e) The Good Samaritan Center, in conjunction with Lutheran Family and Children's Services, operates a transitional
housing program to prepare families for placement in permanent
housing.
Because the implementation phase must necessarily follow
directly from the constraints of the court order, the St. Louis case
is unique in its requirement for services designed to move the
individual homeless persons out of homelessness. Therefore, the
privatization outcome of the St. Louis lawsuit departs significantly from the New York model of a public shelter system.
Originally, the plaintiffs in the New York case had demanded
the right to shelter along with a provision that the shelters be
community based. Believing that there would be too much community opposition, the City would not enter into such an agreement (Main, 1983). The outcome of the New York model became
the infamous "welfare hotels" where 7,800 families are currently
housed. Landlords of these 61 hotels receive an average amount
of $30,000 per year for a typical room with no cooking facilities,
perhaps a refrigerator, and few, if any, social services. Up to 10
families may share a bathroom (Sommers, 1987). In contrast,
City government funding in St. Louis now reaches 41% of the
homeless shelters. Most shelters are small and geographically
dispersed (Johnson, 1988).
Conflict and Control
This partnership between the legal, political and human service systems in an effort to serve the homeless has inherent
elements of conflict and control. These built-in differences, however, can provide a check-and-balance system that can maximize
services for the homeless. These issues of conflict and control
are perhaps most clearly seen in the area of data analysis and
research.
Because the court mandated that monthly reports be relayed
to the legal system for monitoring purposes, there was immediate necessity to move service delivery to the point that it could
be documented that (a) the City was doing what it agreed to do,
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and (b) that the problem was being handled to prevent a return
to court. Should the issue go to trial and an unfavorable verdict
be returned, more extensive or expensive constraints might be
charged to the City. In order to avoid such consequences, it was
in the City's best interest to abide by the decree and have reliable
data to substantiate compliance.
Thus, part of the funding contract induded a research component to computerize data collected from calls to the hotline.
This system records demographic information on each homeless
person, assesses their present condition of homelessness and
reason for homelessness. The hotline staff makes appropriate
shelter referrals, based on daily telephone contact with 24 shelter
providers throughout the City.
Concerning referral to the shelter system, conflict surfaced
around the definitional problem of who the homeless were. In
other words, who was the City responsible to provide shelter
for? Although the consent decree had already officially defined
the homeless, high demand on the hotline system necessitated
operationalization of the legal definition for actual service delivery. This resulted in three categories describing the situation of
homelessness: (a) on the street, (b) immediate crisis (homeless
within 48 hours), and (c) at risk (homeless within 30 days).
The City allowed that only those persons literally on the
street be referred to shelter. Women and children fleeing abusive
conditions were given second priority. The hidden homelessthose living in condemned, substandard or severely overcrowded living conditions were, by and large, exempted from
referral. Should such persons slide into literal homelessness, referral could occur. Howver, during the second year of HSN operation, City funding for the hotline increased. A staff person
was hired to intervene with at-risk persons to prevent their further descent into homelessness.
Use of the data for public and academic purposes also reveals
the existence of conflict and control within the model. Although
data collection activities were supported by public funds, a relatively dosed system remains around access to and usage of the
data. The City requests full knowledge and prior written consent
be obtained for articles written for academic journals, books or
media reports that use data collected from hotline calls. The data
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have the potential to provide a rich source of documentation to
advocate for federal funds for local services. However, it has
basically been more narrowly used to establish the fact that the
literal homeless have been referred to shelter. Thus, although the
City works diligently through the HSN to create an open and
participative system among community providers, access to data
and the disbursement of provider agency reports has been
minimal.
Discussion
It has been noted that the few cities which have used the
courts in this way have not been totally satisfied with the outcome (Fabricant & Epstein, 1984). It has also been stated that the
legal remedies in these cases, although used sparsely and although producing mixed results, have on balance seemed to be
good leverage to quickly move political bureaucracy to assume
some degree of responsibility along with private agencies in the
respective jurisdictions (Sloss, 1984).
Although the courts clearly gave ownership of the problem
of homelessness to the City, the City's response of privatization
moved the responsibility for primary policy implementation into
the existing human service marketplace. Traditionally, such a
shift of responsibility through privatization allows government
to shift ownership of the problem to the voluntary sector while
still retaining control of implementation through its funding options. In other words, privatization frees politicians to say to
social service providers "You bought the problem, now why isn't
it solved?" In this case, however, the privatization model was
not free to operate without the imperative check-and-balance
monitoring system of the court; the City could not fully dislocate
itself from the homelessness problem. Privatization can also lead
to false assumptions on the part of the funding agency to believe
that a social problem is taken care of. Sosin (1987, p. 3) writes:
"Accordingly, government might make use of private agencies
to deal with, or deflect demand through such mechanisms as
contracting out ... to claim that a problem is being handled."
Agencies which have been traditionally advocative for disadvantaged populations, also risk being co-opted by the contract-for-services model with government. At best, they
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experience a sense of the loss of advocacy-or they advocate at
risk of loss of funding. Within the privatization model, client
advocacy must be tempered with the demands and/or constraints of the governmental funding agency. Bassuk and Lauriat
(1984) point out the politicalization of homelessness and upbraid
the lack of nonpartisan advocates taking a stand for more than
short-term shelter provision for the homeless. In the St. Louis
homeless arena, Reverend Rice remains an outspoken critic of
homeless services. He charges that persons who have received
the HSN range of services are being recycled into homelessness
as another wave of urban renewal displaces them from Section 8
apartments on the near southside. The power of his advocacy
remains based on his philosophical stance and unwillingness to
take any public funds.
In summary, privatization as described here, though not
without costs, nevertheless is a workable model for the provision
of publicly-funded and mandated homeless services. Unlike the
more problematic warehousing model of New York City, it does
provide scattered site services to the poor. Additionally, needed
financial resources are supplied to agencies traditionally working with disadvantaged populations like the homeless. More
research needs to be done on the implications of such service
delivery systems which employ privatization and the additional
component of legal mandate. Smith (1987, p. 4) hypothesizes
that "the increasingly extensive use of contracting for government services with nonprofit agencies ... may generate a new
politics of social welfare services with profound implications for
the future of social welfare policy."
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